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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss the changes in relationship between central and local 
government in Norway in a decade of reforms both at central and local levels. A main 
topic is the balance between unity and diversity or state integration and local autonomy. 
The concepts of coordination and specialization are discussed and we examine the 
dynamic changes in the relationships between different mechanisms of coordination, 
different forms of specialization and integration vis-à-vis autonomy. Changes in 
structures and in procedures both centrally and locally and in the relationship between 
state and local government have made the coordination of tasks difficult whereby 
central regulations have taken new forms and become even stronger. Paradoxically, 
reforms aimed at more local autonomy have resulted in even stronger integration. 
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Sammendrag 
I dette notatet diskuterers endringer i relasjonene mellom statlig og kommunalt nivå i 
Norge etter 15 år med omfattende reformer både på sentralt og lokalt nivå. Et 
hovedtema er balansen mellom statlig integrasjon og lokalt selvstyre. Sentralt i 
diskusjonen står relasjonene mellom ulike spesialiseringsprinsipper og samordnings-
former. Endringer i strukturer og prosedyrer både på sentralt og lokalt nivå og i 
relasjonene mellom stat og kommune har skapt nye utfordringer for samordning både 
horisontalt og vertikalt og de sentrale reguleringene har tatt nye former og blitt 
forsterket. En noe paradoksal konklusjon er at reformer som skulle styrke det lokale 
selvstyret har resultert i sterkere statlig integrasjon, og forfatterne reiser spørsmålet om 
vi er på veg inn i reguleringsstaten og effektueringskommunen.  
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Introduction 
The main topic of this paper is the challenges of coordinating central government 
activities and local self-government in Norway after fifteen years of comprehensive 
reforms at both central and local levels. On the one hand, the main organizational forms 
have been rather stable. Norway still has about the same number of municipalities; 
neither have there been changes in ministries and central agencies as the main 
organizational forms in central government. On the other hand, internal organizational 
structures and procedures both at local and central levels have been transformed as have 
the relations between them. These structural and procedural changes have made internal 
coordination at central as well as at local level difficult. Coordination between central 
and local authorities has also faced challenges. 
Administrative reforms at the central level have generally neglected cooperation 
across sectors. Major reform measures such as management-by-objective-and-result 
(MBOR), performance auditing, monitoring and control have first and foremost been 
directed towards the vertically sector-based dimension in government administration. 
Other reform measures such as increased local autonomy in municipal organisation and 
structural devolution through the formation of state-owned companies and semi-
autonomous regulatory agencies have, however, enhanced fragmentation and challenged 
the vertical coordination. In turn this fragmentation is met by new and stronger 
management tools such as standardized services, earmarked grants and individual legal 
rights to welfare services. The main purposes of these tools are to incorporate the 
fragmented structures back into the vertical dimension. By these movements horizontal 
coordination between sectors has become more difficult at central level. One 
consequence is that it is difficult to establish cross-ministerial cooperation in policy 
areas. Another consequence is that it is virtually impossible for local authorities to make 
other priorities than those indicated by the central sector-based control measures. 
The question of balance between integration and autonomy is a general problem in all 
multilevel systems (Olsen 2005a). The question has become even more topical in the 
light of increased European integration and associated questions on multi-level 
governance, both between the state and supra-state levels and between state and local 
and regional level (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Olsen 2004, Olsen 2005b, Egeberg 2005). 
In this paper we pay attention to the dynamics of integration and autonomy in central-
local relations and particularly how this interplay is affected by the various forms of 
specialization and coordination mechanisms. We describe the processes of 
transformation, try to understand the driving forces behind the changes and discuss 
some implications for unity and diversity in the Norwegian public sector.  
Organizational research on public administration has revealed that formal 
organisational structure have behavioural consequences for those bodies which are 
affected (Egeberg 2003, Christensen and Lægreid 2004a). In Norway this research has 
largely focused on central administrative bodies, but its findings have also implications 
for central-local relations (Fimreite 2003a). Political and administrative executives have 
had a clear understanding over a long period that policies executed at the central level 
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are of significance for local self government (Flo 2004). Studies of central administration 
and local government have, however, traditionally operated as distinctly separate 
research areas. In this paper, we argue that these research areas – as the policy areas – 
have to be considered jointly. The major challenges involving reorganisation and 
modernisation of the public sector in Norway are located at the interface of central and 
local government organisation. In order to understand these challenges it is also 
necessary for researchers to comprehend this interplay.  
 We commence this paper with a brief description of the Norwegian context. 
Thereafter we discuss key concepts such as coordination and specialisation and present 
some theoretical considerations associated with these concepts. Following this we give 
an empirical presentation of trends in central coordination, in local government 
organisation, and in the relationships between central and local government during the 
last 15 years. Finally, a number of consequences of the interplay between specialisation 
principles, coordination mechanisms and the level of integration and autonomy are 
discussed. Our main argument is that these trends are bringing us closer to a central 
level of government which controls sub-levels strongly, and a local level where the main 
task is to carry out the running and bidding of this central level; that is to say, a multi-
level system characterised by high integration and low autonomy. 
The Norwegian context 
Norway is a unitary, parliamentary and multiparty state with a small population spread 
over a rather large geographical area. Since the early 1970s, it has been ruled by minority 
governments. It has a strong democratic tradition, scores high on per capita income and 
an abundance of natural resources, has relatively strong collectivist and egalitarian 
values, is consensus-oriented, and has a low level of internal conflicts and well-
developed corporatist arrangements. Norway has a strong tradition of significant local 
self-government with enhanced autonomy and municipalities with their own elected 
democratic institutions. It also has one of the most comprehensive and universal welfare 
states in the world with a large public sector. Being responsible for implementing the 
welfare state in areas such as elementary schools, elderly care, social security and health 
care, the municipalities constitute a major part of the public sector both in number of 
employees and in financial resources. Today there are 433 municipalities with an average 
size of about 10,000 inhabitants. The central government is divided into 18 different 
ministerial areas. The relationships between parliament, ministers, and central agencies 
are based on the principle of ministerial responsibility, meaning that the minister is 
responsible to Parliament for all activities within his or her policy area in the ministry as 
well as in subordinate state bodies.  
The relationship between central and local government is a mixture of political 
decentralization based on the principle of local autonomy, and administrative 
decentralization based on the principle of delegated authority. Political control over the 
civil service has been general and passive, allowing the executive considerable leeway. 
This seems to reflect some major features of the political-administrative system: high 
levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes and norms among political and administrative 
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leaders, within the public sector in general and in the relationship between central and 
local authorities (Christensen and Lægreid 2005b, Fimreite et al. 2004). The level of trust 
in public institutions is generally higher than in most other countries (Norris 1999). 
Surveys of political support for national government and parliament nearly always 
accord Norway a leading position. Nevertheless, the pattern of trust in political 
institutions is cyclical, and the level was lower at the end of the 1990s than in the early 
1980s (Listhaug 1995).  
Since the mid-1990s New Public Management (NPM) has gained a stronger foothold 
in Norway, and reforms have become increasingly comprehensive and radical in recent 
years (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The introduction of Management-by-Objectives-
and-Results, private sector management tools, changes in forms of affiliation from 
integrated ministerial models to single-purpose models, agencification, autonomisation, 
introduction of provider-purchaser models, quasi-markets, contract mamagement and 
privatisation has been the result. This trend is especially significant in local government 
(Øgård 2001, Hovik og Stigen 2004).  
We will now turn our attention to theoretical concepts that can be used to scrutinize 
the transformation at central and local level and in the relationships between levels. 
Theoretical approach and central 
concepts  
The theoretical departure of this paper is an organisational perspective based on the 
concept of bounded rationality (March and Simon 1958). The perspective implies that 
decision-makers have limited time and attention and cannot address all goals, all 
alternatives, and all consequences. They face problems of capacity and understanding 
and have to make some selections. Decision-makers act normally on behalf of formal 
organizations. Therefore formal organizational structures represent important selection 
mechanisms. Formal structures and procedures organize some actors, cleavages, 
problems, and solutions into decision-making processes in the public sector; while 
others are excluded (Schattschneider 1960, Olsen 1978).  
Structures forms information networks and constrain conflict patterns. Organi-
zational structures create also joint identities among actors. For instance, persons acting 
on behalf of a central ministerial department perform their tasks according to a «logic of 
appropriateness» brought forward by such identities (March and Olsen 1989). Thus, 
public organizations are institutions with an independent influence based on their 
established structures, identities and culture. Their quality depends on their success in 
balancing unity, integration and system coordination on the one hand and diversity, 
flexibility and local (government) autonomy on the other (Olsen 2004). 
An organizational perspective presumes that one has to study how the public sector 
is organized in order to understand how it works. It makes a difference whether central 
government is an integrated system under ministerial responsibility or a disintegrated 
system of autonomous or semi-autonomous municipalities, how it is coordinated 
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vertically and horizontally, and whether it is specialized according to the principle of 
geography, process, purpose or clientele (Gulick 1937, Christensen and Lægreid 2004c).  
Essential elements in this reasoning are concepts such as coordination, specialisation, 
integration and autonomy. There are generally three criteria for recognizing integration 
between units: their interdependence, consistency and structural connectedness (March 
1999). Vertical coordination is concerned with the coordination of various 
administrative levels, for example between ministry and subordinate authorities, 
between central and local authorities, and between central government and state 
agencies at the local level. Horizontal coordination concerns policy areas or sectors at 
the same level such as between health, school, the environment, and public transport at 
central or local level.  
A distinction may also be made between coordination through policy formulation, 
and coordination through implementation of measures (Peters 2004). While the former 
is concerned with coordination where the focus is on agreement of clear and consistent 
goals, the latter relates to administrative coordination focusing on the choice of means 
or process, or to ensure that all adhere to the procedure once the course has been 
agreed (Painter 1982, Boston 1992). Connected to this one can also speak of 
coordination of resources and coordination of activities. The first type of coordination 
is generally to be found in central government, while the latter is to be found locally, at 
the organisation’s ’level of operations’. 
Coordination may be practiced employing different mechanisms (Mintzberg 1979). It 
may denote direct orders and instructions, but it is more common that the coordinating 
mechanisms contain an element of standardisation. Administrative procedures, goals 
and results, or proficiency, loyalty and skills may all be standardized to increase 
coordination. Finally, mutual adjustment between actors, administrative levels and 
organisations may also represent a form of coordination.  
The relative importance of these coordination mechanisms within the Norwegian 
administrative system has changed over time: coordination by direct orders has become 
less significant relative to the standardisation of goals, results and decisions. Mutual 
adjustment also becomes more difficult when trust is weakened as a consequence of 
new management tools. MBOR partly presumes distrust and takes as a starting point 
that sub-level entities first and foremost will pursue self-interests. Central government 
does not trust local government to respect unity and common interests in their 
decisions. The result is more control measures. One reason for this change in the 
relative positions is that coordination and coordination mechanisms are challenged 
when principles of organisational specialisation are undergoing change (Verhoerst and 
Bouckaert 2005). The principle of specialisation is concerned with tasks and relations 
which should be regarded in conjunction and coordinated, and which could be kept 
detached. And different specialization principles will enhance different networks, 
identities and conflict patterns. An organization specialized according to the 
geographical area served will encourage policy makers to primarily pay attention to 
particular territorial concerns. Sector specialisation has a tendency to weaken relations 
which have been developed territorially, for example on geographically-based units such 
as municipalities, and to strengthen policy standardization across territorial units. 
Redesigning sectorally specialized organizations into geographically structured ones 
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would thus tend to transform functional conflicts into territorial conflicts (Egeberg 
2001, 2004a). Generally, increased specialisation results in the increased need for 
coordination (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004), but which specialisation principle is to be 
selected will be of considerable significance for the choice of coordinating mechanisms.  
The first question is, therefore, whether the same specialisation principle shall apply 
at both central and local levels or can these principles be at variance. The next question 
concerns the implications this may have for multi-level coordination as well as 
coordination internally at the different levels. For example, will a central level organised 
by sector, and local government by clients (or process or area) imply a weak vertical 
coordination between central and local level while horizontal coordination within local 
government is well-established? Will the result of this be increased autonomy and 
holistic thinking locally? And will this, in turn, present a challenge to integration 
between the two levels of government resulting in the need for new coordination 
measures designed at counteracting the consequences of autonomy?  
With these questions in mind, we turn to an examination of how specialisation, 
coordination, autonomy and integration have occurred and developed within central 
government, at local level, and in the relationship between the central and local 
government over the period from 1992 up until to day in Norway. Given our theoretical 
discussion, we use an analytical scheme as presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Interplay between principles of specialisation, coordination mechanisms, structure and policy 
and integration and autonomy – an analytical scheme 
SPECIALIZATION 
PRINCIPLE 
COORDINATION 
MECHANISMS BETWEEN 
CENTRAL AND LOCAL 
LEVEL 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY INTEGRATION AND 
AUTONOMY 
If there is a common 
principle of 
specialization 
according to sector 
across the level of 
central and local 
government; or if the 
local government is 
specialized according 
to geographical area, 
process or clients.  
If there is coordination 
by standardization of 
knowledge, of goals, of 
results and procedures, 
of policy content, or by 
mutual adaptation 
based on common 
identities and mutual 
trust. 
Degree of structural 
similarities between 
municipalities and 
central government and 
degree of similarities in 
policy content. 
Implication of different 
specialization principles 
and coordination forms 
on the relationship 
between state 
integration and local 
autonomy 
The argument of multi-level dynamics 
According to classical sociological theory we will threat integration and autonomy as 
two different dimensions (Durkheim 1964, 2001). This way to handle integration and 
autonomy in multilevel-systems is also found in Stein Rokkans works about centre and 
periphery in Norway (Rokkan 1987) and in recent work on European integration (Olsen 
2004, 2005a). Using the two dimensions in this way, we will present the hypotheses that 
the Norwegian local government institution has moved from a situation with high 
integration and high autonomy in the period after World War 2 via a situation with the 
intention of lower integration and high autonomy following the introduction of the 
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Local Government Act of 1992, towards a situation indicating lower autonomy and high 
integration (Fimreite, Flo og Tranvik 2002). We will pursue the hypotheses in our 
following discussion. In Norway local government was the most important 
implementer in the welfare state after World War 2. Because of this local government 
had to be integrated into the central administrative apparatus. It was also important that 
local government should be able to adjust central goals to local needs when 
implementing politics. To do so they had to have a certain amount of autonomy. They 
also needed autonomy to exercise their obligation to take all welfare services into 
consideration and prioritise between them. From the beginning of this era it was local 
government that practised horizontal coordination in the Norwegian welfare state.  
One condition for local autonomy is that there is room for choice, degrees of 
freedom and the possibility for exercising discretion at the local level. In 1992, Norway 
acquired a new Local Government Act. Of particular importance in an organisational 
perspective is that this act provides local authorities with a considerable degree of 
volition in determining their own organisational structure. The previous rigid structure, 
which was based on the same principle of specialization according to sector as in the 
central government, could now be abandoned. Local authorities utilised this freedom, 
and during the last ten years a comprehensive organisational transformation has 
occurred locally. The proportion of municipalities with a sector organisation strictly 
reflecting that of the central level declined from 85% to 4% between 1992 and 2004, 
with the consequence that today only 12 municipalities retain a strong sector-based 
organisational model (Hovik and Stigen 2004). 120 municipalities have however what is 
labelled a modified sector-based organization. Changes in organisation are mainly found 
both at administrative and political level locally. At the same time as the municipalities 
acquired this organisational emancipation, it is maintained that their possibility to 
choose the content of their own policies has been restricted (Fimreite 2003b, Fimreite et 
al. 2004).  
The balance between unity and diversification became a challenge arising from the 
organisational emancipation resulting from the new Local Government Act. One reason 
for this is that formal organizational structure creates identities. Actors acting on behalf 
of organizations do so, as we have pointed out, according to «a logic of 
appropriateness». Parallel organizational structures at central and local level may create 
the same appropriateness at both levels and are therefore important if common 
identities among decision-makers at different levels are desired. The mutual trust that 
common identities open up for may be very significant for an acceptable balance 
between integration and autonomy in a multi-level system. Parallel structures make it 
easy for central ministerial actors to establish contact with their local level counterparts 
who are responsible for implementation. The Ministry of Education will, for example, 
know who to consult at local level and also how to speak to them when educational 
politics are in question. Similarity in training and professional background and 
corresponding task portfolios are important parts of these «sector-connections» between 
levels.  
Research has revealed that the relationship between central and local level in Norway 
since World War 2 can been characterized as one of high level of mutual trust (Flo 
2003). Given our theoretical departure will argue that sector-based organizational 
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structures at both levels which brought forward formal as well as informal 
communication are an important part in establishing this trust. One important question 
is whether common identity and trust between the levels is about to change when the 
organisational forms are increasingly less characterised by parallel structures. Recent 
research in this area suggests that we may cautiously affirm this question (Fimreite 
2003b, Fimreite et al. 2004). The consequence of this might be that increased 
organisational autonomy at local level will stimulate increased central control over policy 
formulation. Organizational freedom was granted in the Local Government Act. The 
intention was that this organizational freedom should strengthen local autonomy. But 
central government met this attempt for strengthen autonomy by stronger regulation. 
Especially important here is a new trend of individual legal rights to welfare services 
which local governments have to provide (Tranvik and Fimreite 2005). 
Thus changes in the relationship between central and local government are also related 
to internal changes both at central level and within municipalities and together these 
dynamics increase the tension between central and local government. 
Trends in specialization and coordination 
at central level 
At the central level specialization according to sector is the dominant pattern. The 
principle of ministerial responsibility holds a strong place in Norwegian public 
administration. The individual cabinet minister has a constitutional responsibility 
towards the parliament (Stortinget) for everything practiced by subordinate bodies. 
Ministerial responsibility is considered to be one of the reasons that Norway has strong 
specialised ministries, strong sectors and relatively weak superior ministries with a 
coordination mandate (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The Ministry of Finance is the 
exception, and plays a central coordinating role in finance- and budgetary policy, but 
scarcely features as the predominant ministry in other policy areas. The Office of the 
Prime Minister has become gradually strengthened in recent years, but nonetheless 
continues to play only a modest role as a coordinating body. Attempts to strengthen 
coordination of central policies concerning local government through developing the 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development as a strong superior ministry 
for such issues have been only partly successful. 
Of the specific measures taken towards coordination of central government functions, 
cabinet meetings, so-called letters of allocation/management dialogue and collegiate 
bodies have been especially important. These measures are intended to increase 
coordination across the administrative levels, sectors and ministerial boundaries. Cabinet 
meetings and inter-ministerial collegial bodies are concerned with horizontal 
coordination, while letters of allocation and managerial dialogue shall ensure vertical 
coordination. 
 The extent to which such coordination measures have been successful is open to 
discussion. They have been subjected to critical examination both by researchers and 
practicians (Christensen and Lægreid 2002, Eriksen 2003, Stat og Styring 2005). During 
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cabinet meetings, cabinet ministers rarely suffer a setback in their own area of 
responsibility. Due to the problem of over-load a main rule is that most matters should 
in general not be subjected to decision by the cabinet but determined internally within 
the ministries. The managerial dialogue functions first and foremost as an instrument of 
control between managers at different levels. The elected officials have difficulties in 
finding a natural place within this system (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). Concerning 
the collegial coordinating bodies, these are more frequently characterised as non-
committal advisory bodies than obligatory census-imposing bodies functioning across 
the various ministries. 
 During the last ten years few, if any, horizontal collegial coordinating bodies have 
been established with respect to local government matters such as we have seen 
regarding EU/EEA matters. In a central government where time and attention are 
scarce resources, the increased attention given to problems of coordination at the 
international level may have weakened the focus on corresponding problems at the local 
level. Coordination of local government affairs using legal and financial means has 
indeed increased during the same period, but this has not received specific 
organizational solution. The question remains as to whether vertical coordination at 
central level – through individual rights, minimum standards, statutory provisions and 
earmarked grants – which have been imposed during the last fifteen years, can occur 
without the existence of particular bodies with a specific coordination mandate, while 
horizontal coordination is dependent upon such organisational solutions.  
 One approach to answering this question is to focus on the actual coordination 
occurring at the central level. An important element here is that the development of 
‘single purpose organisations’ results in a more specialised and differentiated central 
administration (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). This comes to expression in the 
splitting up of the integrated organizational model and the establishment of separate 
autonomous bodies for various purposes: ownership, purchasing, service production, 
control, regulation, and policy advice. The establishment of various forms of state 
corporations may be referred to as external autonomy, while internal autonomy is defined 
through the emergence of semi-autonomous central agencies (Grønlie 1998). This 
autonomization is a challenge for coordination both vertically within each sector and 
horizontally across sectors. The reason for this is that in such a fragmented system, each 
organisation is first and foremost responsible for its own activity. In a system governed 
by MBOR it is assumed that the autonomous bodies have clear boundaries, precise 
goals and results that may be clearly read and understood. Such a closed organisational 
system encounters problems within an administrative system which is facing increasingly 
comprehensive inter-organisational and cross-sector problems and challenges (Lægreid 
2001). 
The development towards more autonomy and independence of state organisations 
may easily result in increased ‘negative cooperation’ (Mayntz and Scharpf 1975). The 
desire to coordinate is greater than the wish to be coordinated. In other words we are 
confronted with a coordination paradox which assumes that all agree on the need for 
coordination, so long as it does not apply to their own organisation. An illustrative 
example is the organisation for homeland security as a follow-up to the Vulnerability 
Committee’s report of 2001 (St.meld. no 17 (2001-2002)). There was broad agreement 
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that coordination was a major problem for this policy area, but none of the central 
authorities were willing to be coordinated (Lægreid and Serigstad 2004). 
One reason for this can be that the administrative policy instruments employed in 
recent years, such as MBOR, finance management regulations, management dialogue, 
contracting and a more precise specification of roles, have been particularly directed 
towards vertical coordination. Increased autonomy has occurred simultaneously to 
increased internal control through MBOR assuming extensive measurement and 
reporting of results to the superior authority. Performance auditing as a means of 
controlling results is an associated development (Christensen, Helgesen and Lægreid 
2001). While MBOR enhances administrative coordination between the various levels of 
administration, the increased structural autonomy pulls in the other direction. It is an 
open question whether the overall vertical coordination is strengthened, but what is 
clear is that the coordination measures are largely focused on the vertical dimension, 
ignoring the porbelms of joint-up government and whole of government issues. 
The consequences are that horizontal coordination is challenged at the central level. 
The fact that each individual state body has been regarded as an autonomous 
organization has contributed to this (Brunsson and Sahlin-Anderson 2000). The process 
of increased autonomy has created new challenges for coordination as this takes place 
between administrative executives at different levels, and in particular between the 
political and administrative executives 
In practice it has been difficult to get politicians to function in the coordinating and 
strategic role which was envisaged in these new administrative procedures. A broad 
interview survey among ministers, permanent secretaries, heads of central agencies and 
CEOs of state-owned companies showed that the ministers’ leeway for independent 
political influence is experienced as having been reduced (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002). There may be many reasons for this, but autonomy, the formation of 
corporations, contract management, partial privatisation and de-monopolisation are 
among those trends which are most significant. These measures weaken the politicians’ 
– and probably thereby the government’s opportunity – to perform in the role of a 
horizontal coordinating body. When this occurs the ministers’ possibility to exercise 
vertical coordination within their own policy area is reduced because coordination is 
also challenged through the tension inherent between a reactive political logic and a 
proactive administrative logic. Administrative policy emphasises that the ministries shall 
focus on long-term, strategic planning. The minister’s working-day is, however, 
frequently characterised by routine policy and responses to short time pressure from the 
media and the political opposition. A governmental apparatus is a political organisation 
which needs to be flexible and responsive to demands from the public. Such tensions 
are managed through the development of a managerial and a political governing system 
which are loosely coupled. MBOR, corporate planning, management dialogue, 
personnel and financial regulations leave much to the management sphere and 
strengthen the possibilities for coordination between different level of management, 
while ministers tend to concern themselves by reacting to unanticipated involvement by 
Stortinget and the media. 
Thus, in just a short time a number of major changes have occurred in the view of 
what is considered the best way to organise and coordinate central government 
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(Christensen and Lægreid 2002, 2004c). Within the system both flexibility and the will to 
change are to be found. Horizontal collegial coordinating bodies have emerged astride 
the established ministerial structure. These are, however, often of limited duration, 
oriented towards a specific issue, and with ambiguous authority relations. Their 
effectiveness is restricted by strong sector ministries which do not want to involve 
others in their own fields of responsibility. The well-tried integrated organizational 
model where intersecting demands and considerations were honed against each other 
within the same organisation is replaced by semi-autonomous organisations, each with 
their own tasks. 
 Vertical administrative coordination within sectors is increased with a more 
formalised control system based on MBOR, but is weakened through increased 
autonomy of external bodies and corporations. The greatest challenges are nevertheless 
to be found at the interface between administrative and political coordination, and in 
the coordinating role which the political leadership receives within this system. In 
practice it is difficult for the politicians to «steer more in big issues and less in small 
issues».  
Based on this we will suggest a ‘yes’ in response to our question as to whether 
vertical coordination can be sustained through procedural measures which do not 
necessarily require new organisational units. Such solutions appear first and foremost to 
favour coordination of administrative bodies at different levels, while it is somewhat 
unclear what role the elected representatives have in this system. What does seem clear, 
however, is that it is difficult to institute horizontal coordination without specific 
organisational solutions. 
 One manner of handling tensions arising from different challenges to coordination is 
to adjust the reforms when they are launched in practice. New forms of management 
and coordination seldom replace former practices; they supplement them, or merge with 
the former in new hybrid forms of management, the result being even greater 
complexity. One example is that MBOR has more or less become a new sort of 
regulation. Sophisticated performance indicators can be difficult to differentiate from 
rules as guidelines for actions in subordinated bodies. Trust-based systems, and systems 
based on performance generally complement each other, but they also create new 
tensions when the performance-based models corrupt the trust-based forms 
(Christensen, Lægreid and Stigen 2004). The Norwegian system of government has been 
characterised by a high degree of mutual trust at the central level (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2002). There are indications that this trust is now being challenged and that 
mutual trust as a coordinating mechanism is no longer functioning as efficiently as 
previously. One reason for this might be that an increasing number of management 
tools are based on distrust. 
 The endeavours to sustain coordination are thus facing new tests. This is partly seen 
through the ‘cultivation’ of the ministries as secretariats for the political leadership 
where the borderline between the political and administrative roles becomes increasingly 
diffuse. A clearer division between politics and administration and closer relations are 
required at the same time. The permanent secretaries attempt to draw a dividing line 
between the professional-political advisory role (something which they generally do 
desire), and the party-political role (which they would prefer to avoid). While the 
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permanent secretaries are more closely integrated with the political leadership, the 
administrative executives in agencies and CEOs of state-owned companies are finding 
themselves at arm’s length (Christensen and Lægreid 2002, 2004d). The administrative 
leaders defend those reforms which strengthen their own managerial and coordination 
possibilities in respect of their subordinate bodies, but are more sceptical towards those 
measures which challenge the sector-wise division of functions, and draw them too 
closely into the party-political sphere. The reforms have resulted in the situation 
whereby it is essentially the administrative leaders within each policy area who direct and 
control each other. 
 In summary we may say that the central government apparatus is characterised by 
problems of inter-ministerial coordination. The leaders focus on their own sectors, 
something which contributes to horizontal fragmentation between the policy areas. The 
Norwegian system is dominated by strong specialised ministries, partly the result of the 
ministerial responsibility principle. MBOR, ministerial responsibility and a clearer 
division between the different roles of the state heightens this characteristic of central 
administration, leading to increased vertical administrative coordination within each 
ministerial sphere. But at the same time, this coordination is weakened through the 
transfer of functions to state-owned companies, government enterprises and semi-
autonomous agencies. Whether political coordination both within and between sectors 
is actually strengthened is an open question. The political focus on one’s specific area of 
responsibility is strong, and consequently the challenges of coordination across the 
ministerial areas are considerable, also at the political level. The administrative reforms 
are propelled within separate sectors by strong sector ministers. In a period when 
problems increasingly traverse ministerial boundaries, this contributes to the problems 
of horizontal coordination. 
 One consequence of the weakly developed horizontal coordination mechanism 
within central government is that it is difficult to achieve a coordinated input which 
traverses ministerial boundaries when subordinate levels become involved. Horizontal 
coordination without an organised foundation faces poor odds in an administrative 
apparatus which is strongly vertically oriented as in the Norwegian case. The 
consequences of poor horizontal coordination apply to all types of external bodies, but 
are particularly severe in the case of local authorities. As we have described earlier in this 
paper, local government is responsible for implementing policies in most welfare 
sectors, and are consequently highly integrated into the vertical sector-based welfare 
state. However, they have also to apply a holistic perspective on welfare politics and 
make priorities between sectors. The challenge is no less when one takes into 
consideration the structural changes which have occurred at the local level and in the 
relationship between the state and the municipalities in the same period. It is this aspect 
to which we now turn our attention. 
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Trends in specialization and coordination 
at local level  
In order to understand why the weak horizontal and rather strong vertical coordination 
in central government has a strong influence on local self-government, we have to 
return to the special position held by local government in the Norwegian welfare state. 
This position is described and discussed in earlier paragraphs. Here it is important to 
emphasise that as a result of this position local authorities became a part of the central 
executive apparatus, but retained a considerable opportunity to formulate local policies. 
Simultaneously to being agents for implementing central government policy, they were 
political institutions of their own. Integration was considerable, but so was also 
autonomy (Flo 2004). The institutional challenge was to establish a form of unity within 
this diversity. At the end of World War 2 Norway had around 800 municipalities. Some 
coordination had to take place when goals were formulated and decisions made at the 
state level at the same time as local government was given considerable discretion to 
adjust goals and policies to local needs in the implementation process. An attempt to 
preserve coordination between central and local government was by gradually 
controlling the local level through special acts. These special acts were also introduced 
in areas which were previously unregulated and considered as uniquely local (Fimreite 
2001). 
 The special laws were largely designed to enable particular agencies to administer a 
policy area at the local level. These bodies were granted the power to secure the 
inhabitants’ needs and rights. The special laws were not only of significance for local 
government activities but also for their organisational structure: The special law agencies 
were followed by special law administrators and statutory municipal executive officers 
(e.g. Director of Education, Director of Social Services, Chief Municipal Engineer, 
Chief Municipal Treasurer). One consequence of this was that the post-war local 
government organisation rapidly developed as a facsimile of the central government 
administration. The parallel pattern resulted in a horizontal differentiation of 
administration and service provision also at local level. The result was the so called sector 
municipality (Baldersheim 1993). Sector organisation was strengthened in so far as local 
government was financed through earmarked grants (Rose 1996) and by the 
professional community which spanned boundaries between local and central 
government. 
 The sector associations which emerged also permitted informal control in the 
relations between central and local level. This control had an educational form (Ekker 
1981). Advices, counselling, hearings and guidance are examples of such «educational» 
means of control which became an important supplement to legal and financial 
measures. These informal procedures were a manifestation of the organisational 
integration between central and local government. Using our concepts of coordination 
we may say that the standardisation of skills (professional unity), competence (parallels 
in organisation forms), and partly of results (demands made in the special acts) all 
occurred, but coordination took place first and foremost through mutual adjustment 
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based on trust. An important element in this adjustment appears to be the sector as a 
principle of specialisation. At the initiative of the central government this developed 
virtually identically at central and local level (Strand 1982). This was of course a part of 
the integration of local government into the welfare state, but it also most likely 
prepared the ground for trust based on common identities in the relationship between 
central and local levels (Flo 2003, Fimreite et al. 2004). As we have already argued, it is 
most likely this trust that made the high degree of local autonomy possible in the more 
and more advanced welfare state. 
 Early in the 1980s international criticism of the welfare state and its organisation was 
also applied to Norway (Olsen 1996). The main argument of this criticism was that the 
welfare state promoted standardisation, control, segregation into sectors, and an 
unfortunate differentiation of task accomplishment. The welfare state – and thereby 
local government – was regarded as possessing an organisational structure which was 
more suited to the providers of welfare services and to other administrative actors rather 
than to the users and clients which it was designed to serve. The welfare state was based 
on collective arrangements, and the relation between the individual and the system was 
seldom direct and focused on users and clients. Central control was regarded as an 
important element in ensuring the uniformity of this collective arrangement in respect 
of Norwegian local government (Fimreite 2001). Thus was the basis for the slogan 
which became applied to reforms in local government from the mid 1980s: «freedom 
from detailed control and freedom for local adjustment». The reforms which were to 
attend to this consideration were initiated in a continuous series of legislation 
culminating with the previous describe Local Government Act of 1992. One of the 
most important elements of this act is that it enables the adjustment of the political and 
administrative structure at local level to meet local needs. It was an expressed objective 
that through this form of internal autonomy, local government would achieve an 
independence from central control (Tranvik and Fimreite 2005). An important 
assumption for increased autonomy was, in the opinion of the reformers, that the sector 
similarity of the central and local level would be reduced. This was considered essential 
as local government was to be relieved of sector-based state control (Strand 1982). 
As we have seen earlier in this paper the local authorities in Norway have taken 
advantage of the freedom inherent in the act with regard to organisation. Management 
structures and organisational models based on varying inter-sector principles are 
introduced at local level. As a replacement of a sector-based organisational structure 
associated with the welfare areas, there are today a variety of organisational solutions 
among Norwegian local authorities. The dominant principle of specialisation is no 
longer based on (welfare-)sector. Other specialisation principles such as clients, area and 
process are now more dominant. The type of local government which emerged as a 
result of the autonomy granted to local government can be named the service municipality 
(Baldersheim 1993). Among the many consequences of this development is a stronger 
leadership at top-level locally, but also that sector considerations have to give way to 
horizontal coordination at local level (Vabo 2001).  
 The question now is: What happens when the sector-organised central level with 
strong vertical coordination measures – but weaker horizontal coordination measures – 
have to rely on a local implementation partner with other principles of specialisation 
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than the sector? How can the coordination between the level responsible for goal 
formulation and policy decisions, and the level responsible for carrying out and 
determining appropriate means to fulfilling the goals take place when the specialisation 
principle between them is different? And does this have any significance for the balance 
between integration and autonomy in the relationship between the levels? 
Why stronger integration when 
autonomy was the intention? 
In order to answer the questions raised here we return to the dynamic relations between 
specialisation principles and measures of coordination. One strategy is that central 
government develops new, strong, sector-based control measures for maintaining 
vertical coordination, to compensate for the loss of integration due to the development 
of different specialization principles at local level. The assumption that autonomous 
organisations require regulation and that regulation requires autonomous organisations 
gains support (Christensen and Lægreid 2005a). This «paradox of regulation» may be 
used to explain the development away from increased integration when, in fact, the 
intention was more autonomy. 
 As we see it, the key to the paradox of regulation lies in the sector organisation and 
the problem of coordination which such organisation brings about at central level. The 
fact that municipalities become organised according to other specialisation principles 
than those employed at central level probably reinforces structural friction between the 
various administrative levels which has existed over a longer period. Local government 
in Norway is given considerable responsibility and manage a wide range of resources 
and it is therefore difficult for the central level to loosen its control of local level. The 
result is that integration persists even though increased autonomy based on the principle 
of local self-government is desirable (Fimreite et al. 2004). When the internal autonomy 
at local level, in accordance with the Local Government Act, resulted in lesser 
organisational similarity between central and local level, the central sector-based control 
possibilities were also reduced. The impact of special acts, ad hoc bodies and ear-
marked grants were reduced and coordination between the level responsible for policy 
formulation and the level responsibility for implementation was challenged. The main 
reason for this challenge is that welfare sectors are still an essential element of the 
Norwegian government system even though this is no longer the case at the local level. 
Central sector interests in the ministries, in parliament, and within professional 
organisations will then try to compensate for the decline of control. Compensation takes 
place by introducing and developing new sector-based control mechanisms such as 
statutory standards of service, central control and monitoring, and individual rights to 
welfare services (Fimreite et al. 2004, Helgøy and Serigstad 2004, Tranvik and Fimreite 
2005). Deregulation of the organisational structure created re-regulation through new 
acts, provisions and regulations. 
Control mechanisms are a part of vertical coordination at central level but also a part 
of the coordination in the relationship between central and local levels. The mechanisms 
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employed represent a movement from trust-based, sector-specific means of control to 
mechanisms which can be characterised by standardisation of results, procedures, 
decisions and knowledge/expertise. The new mechanisms are to a large degree based on 
distrust of the abilities of subordinate levels. All this happens because the sector 
representatives at central level fear that local authorities with their holistic perspective of 
welfare policy, and the possibility to make priorities across sectors would not give 
priority to precisely their area. Horizontal coordination at the local level becomes a 
threat to the sectors at the central level, and they seek to control local coordination by 
enforcing priorities through statutory legislation. The argument behind this is that the 
quality of local services in the ‘losing’ sectors will decline but also that local skills within 
sectors of lower priority are diminished. The central sector authorities cannot take this 
risk first and foremost because the quality of services available to users might suffer, but 
also because their own status and influence centrally will be effected (Tranvik and 
Fimreite 2005). 
Consequently, our claim is that when the sector municipality is weakened and the 
service municipality emerges, a structural dynamic within the welfare state is activated. 
The dynamic results in sector actors at central level introducing new forms of control 
measures within their own areas of authority (Tranvik and Fimreite 2005). Vertical 
coordination measures are initiated centrally in order to terminate any possible 
consequences of local horizontal coordination which is contrary to central sector 
interests. Thus, the executing municipality presented as a hypotheses around 2000 (Fimreite 
and Flo 2000), is increasingly becoming a reality. The executive municipality has high 
level of integration and nearly no autonomy. 
If we apply this to the problem of coordination, we may say that the actors appear to 
be trapped by the dynamic of the interplay between the coordinating mechanisms and 
the specialisation principles at central and local levels. New means of control of local 
government can be understood from this perspective as a link in the vertical 
coordination between central and local level. They can, however, also be understood as 
the manner by which the sector protects its own functions and resources in the 
competition on resources between the ministries centrally. Regulation by legal rights 
jurisdiction, minimum standards and statutory regulations can be appropriate means for 
sector ministries in preserving their own sector in the competition with other ministries. 
Therefore the new control mechanisms are a link also in the vertical coordination at 
central level. In consequence the vertical management processes will be an obstacle to 
horizontal coordination, not only locally but also centrally. In other words, we are 
concerned with mutually influencing processes in the relations between central 
coordination and local self-government where changes occur through many different – 
although not necessarily coordinated – processes. 
This dynamic interplay between central and local level with regards to various 
coordinating and specialisation principles presented so fare is summed up in Figure 3.  
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Figure 2. Interplay between principles of specialisation, coordination mechanisms,) structure and politics 
and integration/autonomy – empirical illustrations 
SPECIALISATION 
PRINCIPLE 
COORDINATION MECHANISMS 
BETWEEN CENTRAL AND 
LOCAL LEVEL 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY INTEGRATION AND 
AUTONOMY OVER TIME 
Specialisation 
according to sector 
both within the state 
and the municipality 
Standardisation of skills 
and results, but also 
mutual adaptation through 
loyalty and common 
identity 
Structural similarity in 
policy content: central 
formulation of goals 
and local 
corresponding use of 
means 
 
1945–1992 
Sector municipality 
 
Within the state 
increased specialisation 
according to the sector, 
but other specialisation 
principles (geography, 
process, target group) 
in the municipality 
Standardisation of goals, 
results and procedures 
Structural differences, 
increasing differences 
in policy content. 
Central formulation of 
goals and local 
practices increasingly 
imbalanced 
 
1992–2000 
Service municipality 
 
Within the state 
specialisation according 
to sector, other 
specialisation principles 
in the municipalities. 
Sector principle 
reintroduced at the 
unit level in 
municipalities through 
statutory determination 
of rights and the two-
level model 
Standardisation of content 
in resolutions and 
administrative procedures: 
individual rights, minimum 
standards and statutory 
provisions 
Increasing structural 
differences, but 
increasing similarities 
in policy content. 
Central definition of 
goals, but also in a 
stronger degree of 
central formulation of 
means 
 
2000– 
Executing 
municipality 
 
Integration and autonomy revisited: A 
regulatory state and executing 
municipalities  
Variety of organisational forms at the local level carry with them a need by central 
government for unity and standardisation in policy formulation and goal definition as 
well as in service supply and use of means. While there is divergence in the 
organisational forms, the policy content shows convergent trends through the 
standardisation of services and individual legal rights for users and clients of welfare 
services. The gains achieved along one dimension have a tendency to result in costs 
elsewhere. Increased autonomy in the choice of organisational forms is faced with 
increased integration in respect of policy formulation and the means employed. 
As in MBOR more generally; increased autonomy, independence and flexibility in 
day-to-day affairs requires new management, control, monitoring and reporting 
functions. The price paid by local units for increased autonomy in the use of available 
resources is that they must subject themselves to a more rigid performance reporting 
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and appraisal regime. Adaptation into the system is stronger along this dimension. 
MBOR is thus a double-edged sword which opens up to autonomy as well as external 
control (Bleiklie, Lægreid and Vik 2003, Hood et al. 1999). 
In our discussions in this paper we have treated integration and autonomy as two 
different dimensions. We have pointed out that under certain conditions increased 
integration will not necessarily mean decreased autonomy. Both autonomy and 
integration can increase or decrease simultaneously, e.g. increased autonomy through 
de-regulation and devolution can correspond with increased integration through 
routines of reporting and monitoring. Local bodies can thus acquire more autonomy 
simultaneous to becoming more closely integrated. This argument of mutual dependent 
processes in multi-level governance are well known in the literature on integration and 
autonomy in the European Union (Egeberg 2004a, Olsen 2004) and also on autonomy 
and control in the field of administrative reform (Verhoerst et al. 2004). Our argument 
is that there is a co-evolution between autonomy and integration and in situation with 
high mutual trust it is possible to enhance both dimensions at the same time. We also 
argue that such trust relations as well as the relations between autonomy and integration 
are connected to coordination mechanisms and principles of specialisation.A theoretical 
implication from this is that there is neither a simple remedy for success, nor a clear 
formula concerning those techniques which unite the different considerations and 
reequirements in a multi-level system. We have argued that local autonomy is under 
pressure when, with the aid of MBOR, central government intensifies integration 
between the levels. It appears difficult to reconcile the principle of local autonomy 
where the assumptions are that the goals must be formulated locally with an MBOR-
system. The whole idea in this system is that the local level shall be a neutral and loyal 
executive instrument of goals and subsequently means-determined at the central level 
(Lægreid 2001). MBOR and similar management techniques imply that the idea of 
separate and autonomous spheres in the system is abandoned to the advantage of the 
philosophy of integration and common goals at all levels of management. The result can 
be a local level whose function is solely that of implementing goals and policies 
determined centrally. In the Norwegian system of government this indicates that 
dimensions which were previously clearly distinguishable from each other both 
ideologically and strategically (Flo 2004) are in the process of being consolidated. The 
local level scores low on the autonomy dimension, while the central level scores high on 
the integration dimension.  
 Our discussion of resent developments indicates however that the two dimensions 
are becoming increasingly consolidated and that it is no longer easy to maintain the 
distinction between them. One condition for still treating autonomy and integration as 
different dimensions is probably that there is mutual trust between levels involved. 
Mutual trust permits mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism. In this paper we 
have argued that trust is increasingly lacking both at central level and in the relationship 
between the levels, and it is becoming more common that measures used to control 
actors and organizations at both levels are based on distrust. The movement from a 
sector-municipality via a service-municipality to an executing municipality can be 
interpreted according to changes in this particular condition. 
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 Our argument has been that organisation forms are important when this 
development is to be explained. Of particular importance is the choice of specialisation 
principle. The interplay between sector-based and territorial-based specialisation 
principles is central to the multi-level system. Regarding Norwegian central 
administration we have manifested a development where specialisation along sector 
lines has been extended and strengthened at the central level. The specialised ministries 
are even more powerful as a result of this. At the local level the organisational forms 
have become more numerous, implying that links between the levels become more 
detached. The intention was that detached organisational links should weaken central 
control of the local levels based on vertical sector-based coordination. In turn this 
should provide the local level with increased possibilities for cross-sector horizontal 
coordination. We have argued that the possibilities for this coordination are disturbed 
when the central level compensates for the loss of control resulting from the looser 
organisational linkages, partly by developing new sector-based means of control, and 
partly by strengthening existing methods. The possibility for local government to 
formulate goals and means is reduced, and the municipalities largely become an 
executing agent on behalf of central government. When organisational autonomy 
increases, the substantial integration becomes larger. It is thus an empirical question 
what the combined result will be concerning the balance between integration and 
autonomy in a multi-level system. 
 What may be learnt from these in general theoretical terms concerning coordination 
and specialisation in a multi-level system? We would argue that a main lesson is that 
different specialisation principles at two organisational levels which are so mutually 
dependent upon each other as central and local government within the Norwegian 
welfare state system, present major challenges to coordination. Such challenges are not 
restricted to the relation between the levels; they also apply internally at each level. The 
mechanisms for coordination which develop as a result of the internal challenges at each 
level – as well as the relationship between them – are largely directed to re-establishing 
lost managerial possibilities when the specialisation principles diverge. One manner to 
control this is to establish strong, organisation-based horizontal coordination measures 
at the central level. Concerning the Norwegian state, strong cross-sector, 
comprehensive, ministerial units will be one such solution. This may be reflected in a 
strong Ministry for Domestic Affairs or in ministries with clear general and 
geographically defined areas of responsibility. Such solutions are also likely within other 
multi-level system with a need for coordination between levels with their own 
specialisation principle, whether this is on sub-state or supra-state levels. 
 Another lesson is that to balance integration and diversity/autonomy in a multi-
functional political-administrative system it will probably be more successful to combine 
different organizational forms than to go only for one principle of specialization or one 
single coordination mechanism (Egeberg 2005). Such organization forms combines 
sector specialization and geographic specialization and could handle the fact that 
decision-makers and actors often have multiple identities and have to attend to both 
primary and secondary loyalties. The challenge is to weigh carefully the dynamic 
relationship between the different forms of specialization and coordination. How to 
analyze the different combinations is however, unsettled both theoretically and 
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empirically. In practice different forms of specialization and coordination occurs 
simultaneously, in parallel or in mutual interaction and thus producing big challenges 
both for researchers and for practitioners. 
References 
Baldersheim, Harald (1993) «Kommunal organisering: Motar sel, men ressursar avgjer?», in Per Lægreid 
and Johan P. Olsen (eds): Organisering av offentlig sektor. Oslo: Tano. 
Bleiklie, Ivar, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Vik (2003) «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». Working-Paper no 2. Bergen: The Rokkan Centre. 
Boston, Jonathan (1992) «The Problems of Policy Coordination: The New Zealand Experiment», 
Governance, 5 (1): 88–103. 
Brunsson, Nils and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson (2000) «Constructing Organizations. The Case of Public 
Sector Reform», Organization Studies, 21 (4): 721–746. 
Christensen, Tom, Sturle Berg Helgesen and Per Lægreid (2001) «En revitalisert Riksrevisjon», in Bernt 
Sofus Tranøy and Øyvind Østerud (eds): Den fragmenterte stat. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2002) Reformer og lederskap. Omstilling i den utøvende makt. Oslo: 
Universitetesforlaget. 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2004a) «Public administration research in Norway: organization 
theory, institutionalism and empirical studies in a democratic context»,” Public Administration, 82 (3): 
679–690. 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2004b) “Autonomization and policy capacity – the dilemmas and 
challenges facing political executivers»,” in M. Painter and Jon Pierre (eds): Challenges to State Policy 
Capacity. London: Palgrave. 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2004c) «Governmental autonomization and control. The Norwegian 
way», Public Administration and Development, 24: 129–135. 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2004d) «Coping with complex leadership roles: The problematic 
redefinition of government-owned companies», Public Administration, 81 (4): 803–831. 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2005a) «Agencification and regulatory reforms». Paper presented at 
The SCANCOR/SOG workshop on «Autonomization of the state: From integrated administrative 
models to single purpose organizations». Stanford University 1–2 April 2005. 
Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (2005b) «Trust in government – the relative importance of service 
satisfaction, political factors and demography», Public Performance & Management Review (Forthcoming). 
Christensen, Tom, Per Lægreid and Inger Stigen (2004) «Performance Management and Public Sector 
Reform: The Norwegian Hospital Reform». Paper presented at the EGPA-conference, Ljubljana, 1–4 
september. 
Durkheim, Emile (1964) The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press. 
Durkheim, Emile (2001) Selvmordet – en sosiologisk undersøkelse. Selection and introduction by Dag Østerberg 
(3. edition). Oslo: Gyldendal. 
Egeberg, Morten (2001) «The Organizational Dimension of Integration in the EU (and Elsewhere)», 
Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (5): 728–746. 
Egeberg, Morten (2003) «How Bureaucratic structure matters: An organizational perspective»,” in B. Guy 
Peters and Jon Pierre (eds): Handbook of Political Administration. London: Sage. 
Egeberg, Morten (2004a) «An organizational approach to European integration. Outline of a 
complementary approach»,” European Journal of Political Research, (43): 199–214. 
Egeberg, Morten (2005) «EU-institutions and the transformation of European level politics: How to 
understand profound change (if it occurs)», Comparative European Politic, no. 3: 102–117. 
WORKING PAPER  7  –  2005 SPECIALIZAT ION AND COORDINATION:  … 
26 
Ekker, Harald (1981) «Kommunene og den uformelle staten». Notat, Møre og Romsdal Distriktshøyskole. 
Eriksen, S. (2003) I kongens navn. Oslo: Statskonsult. 
Fimreite, Anne Lise (2001) Lovfestede retter og lokalt folkestyre. Bergen: The LOS-centre, Report no 5/2001 
Fimreite, Anne Lise (2003a) Der hvor intet er, har selv keiseren tapt sin rett! Om lokalt folkestyre og rettigheter. 
Bergen: The Rokkan Centre, Report no 8/2003. 
Fimreite, Anne Lise (2003b) «Velferdsstat og lokaldemokrati – uforenelige størrelser?», Norsk 
Statsvitenskaplig Tidsskrift, no 3: 334–358. 
Fimreite, Anne Lise and Yngve Flo (2000) «Et spørsmål om tillit. Ideologiske endringer i den norske 
statens kommunalpolitikk etter 1975». The LOS-centre, Working-Paper no 31/2000. 
Fimreite, Anne Lise, Yngve Flo and Tommy Tranvik (2002) Lokalt handlingsrom og nasjonal integrasjon. 
Kommuneideologiske brytninger i Norge i et historisk perspektiv. The Power and democracy study, report no 
50. Oslo: Unipub forlag. 
Fimreite, Anne Lise, Yngve Flo, Tommy Tranvik and Jacob Aars (2004) Tillit mellom forvaltningsnivåene. 
Bergen: The Rokkan Centre, Report no 4/2004. 
Flo, Yngve (2003) Det lokale og det nasjonale: Statlig politikk overfor det lokale og regionale styringsverket 1900 til i 
dag. The Power and democracy study, Report no 65. Oslo: Unipub. 
Flo, Yngve (2004) Staten og sjølvstyret. Statlig politikk overfor det lokale og regionale styringsverket etter 1900. 
Dissertation, Department of History, University of Bergen. 
Grønlie, Tore (1998) «Drømmen om en konkurransetilpasset stat. Ytre fristilling som styringspolitisk 
redskap 1945–1995», in Tore Grønlie and Per Selle (eds): Ein stat? Fristillingas fire ansikt. Oslo: 
Samlaget. 
Gulick, Lucas (1937) «Notes on the Theory of Organization. With Special Reference to Government», in 
Lucas Gulick og L. Urwin (eds): Papers on the Science of Administration. New York: A.M. Kelley.  
Helgøy, Ingrid and Synnøve Serigstad (2004) «Tilsyn som styringsform i forholdet mellom staten og 
kommunene». Working-Paper no 9. Bergen: The Rokkan centre. 
Hooghe, Lisbet and Gary Marks (2001) Multi-level Governance and European Integration. Lanham, MD.: 
Lowman & Littlefield.  
Hood, Christopher et al. (1999) Regulation Inside Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hovik, Sissel and Inger Marie Stigen (2004) Kommunal organisering 2004. Oslo: NIBR, Working-paper no 
124. 
Listhaug, Ola (1995) «The dynamics of trust in politicians», in Hans-Dieter Klingemann & D. Fusch (eds): 
Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lægreid, Per (2001) «Mål og resultatstryring i offentlig sektor – erfaringer og utfrodringer»,” in Anne Lise 
Fimreite, Helge O. Larsen and Jacob Aars (eds): Lekmannsstyre under press. Festskrift til Audun Offerdal. 
Oslo: Kommuneforlaget. 
Lægreid, Per and Synnøve Serigstad (2004) «Organizing for Homeland security. The Case of Norway». 
Working-paper no 12. Bergen: The Rokkan Centre. 
March, James G. (1999) «A Learning Perspective on the Network Dynamics of Institutional Integration», 
in Morten Egeberg and Per Lægreid (eds): Organizing Political Institutions. Oslo: Scandinavian University 
Press. 
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. New York: The Free Press. 
March, James G. and Herbert Simon (1958) Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
Mayntz, Renate and Fritz Scharpf (1975) Policymaking in the German Federal Bureaucracy. Amsterdam: 
Elseiver. 
Mintzberg, Henry (1979) The Structuring of Organizations: a Synthesis of the Research. Lindon: Prentice-Hall. 
Norris, Pippa (1999) Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Olsen, Johan P. (1978) Politisk oganisering. Oslo/Bergen/Trondheim: Universitetsforlaget.  
SPECIALIZAT ION AND COORDINATION:  … WORKING PAPER  7  -  2005  
 27 
Olsen, Johan P. (1996) «Norway: Slow learner – or Another Trimuph of the Tortoise?», in Johan P. Olsen 
and B. Guy Peters (eds): Lessons from Experience. Experiential Learing in Administrative Reforms in Eight 
Democracies. Oslo: Tano Aschehoug. 
Olsen, Johan P. (2004) «Unity, diversity and democratic institutions». Working paper 04/13. Oslo: Arena. 
Olsen, Johan P. (2005a) «Unity and Diversity – European Style». Working Paper 24/2005. Oslo: Arena. 
Olsen, Johan P. (2005b) «The Political organization of Europe: Differentiation and Unification». Working 
Paper 23/2005. Oslo: Arena. 
Painter, Martin (1982) «Central agencies and the coordination principle»,” Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 40: 265–280. 
Peters, B. Guy (2004) «Koordination», in Jens Blom-Hansen, Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard and Thomas 
Pallesen: Politisk ukorrekt. Festskrift til professor Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen. Århus: Aarhus 
Universitetsforlag. 
Pollitt, Christopher and Geert Bouckaert (2004) Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Rokkan, Stein (1987) Stat, Nasjon, Klasse. Essay i politisk sosiologi. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Rose, Lawrence (1996) «Norway», in Erik Albæk et al.: Nordic Local Government. Helsinki: Acta. 
Schattschneider, Elmer Eric (1960) The semi-soverign people. New York: Holt, Rienhart and Windston. 
Stat og Styring (2005) «Sterk kritikk av manglende samordning», Stat og Styring, nr. 1: pp 13-17. 
St.meld. (White paper) no. 17 (2001-2002): Samfunsikkerhet. Veien til et mindre sårbart samfunn. 
St.meld. (White paper) no. 30 (2003-2004): Kultur for læring. 
Strand, Torodd (1982) «Kommunal organisering». Upublisert arbeidsnotat, Institutt for administrasjon og 
organisasjonsvitenskap, Universitetet i Bergen. 
Tranvik, Tommy and Anne Lise Fimreite (2005) «Reform Failure. The Processes of Devolution and 
Centralisation in Norway», Local Government Studies (Forthcoming). 
Vabo, Signy Irene (2001) Koordinering og politisk styring. En studie av nye oppgaveløsinger i norske kommuner. 
Dissertation, Departement of Political Science, University of Oslo. 
Verhoest, Koen, B. Guy Peters, Gert Bouckaert and B. Verschuere (2004) «The Study of Organizational 
Autonomy: A Conceptual Review», Public Administration and Development, 24: 101-118. 
Verhoerst, Koen and Geert Bouckaert (2005) «Machinery of Government and Policy Capacity: The 
Effects of Specialization and Coordination», in Martin Painter and Jon Pierre (eds): Challenges to State 
Policy Capacity. London: Pagrave. 
Øgård, Morten (2001) Forvaltningsinnovasjon i de nordiske regioner/kommuner: I felles takt mot New Public 
Management? Dissertation, Departement of Political Science, University of Oslo. 
WORKING PAPER  7  –  2005 SPECIALIZAT ION AND COORDINATION:  … 
28 
WORKING PAPERS ROKKANSENTERET (ISSN 1503‐0946) 
The publications can be ordered from Rokkansenteret, tel +47 55 58 97 10, 
e‐mail: post@rokkan.uib.no, http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no 
 
2005 
1‐2005  Ivar A. Lima og Agnete Vabø: «Instituttstruktur og fakultetsorganisering ved HF‐fakultetet, 
Universitetet i Bergen». Mai 2005. 
2‐2005  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Modalen: Fra off‐road til on‐line på 25 år». Mai 2005. 
3‐2005  Nanna Kildal: «Fra arbeidsbegrepets historie: Aristoteles til Marx». Mai 2005. 
4‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Autonomy and Control in the Norwegian 
Civil Service: Does Agency Form Matter?». September 2005. 
5‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Regulating Regulatory Organizations: 
Controlling Norwegian Civil Service Organizations». September 2005. 
6‐2005  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Regulatory Reforms and Agencification». November 2005. 
7‐2005  Anne Lise Fimreite and Per Lægreid: «Specialization and Coordination: Implications for 
integration and Autonomy in a Multi‐Level System. November 2005. 
2004 
1‐2004  Dag  Olaf  Torjesen  and  Hallgeir  Gammelsæter:  «Management  Between  Autonomy  and 
Transparency in the Enterprise Hospital». January 2004.  
2‐2004  Haldor Byrkjeflot and Simon Neby: «The Decentralized Path Challenged? Nordic Health Care 
Reforms in Comparison». January 2004.  
3‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «The  Fragmented  State  –  the Challenges  of Combining 
Efficiency, Institutional Norms and Democracy». March 2004. 
4‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Europeisering av tilsynsmyndigheter i Norge og Sverige». Mars 2004. 
5‐2004  Karsten  Vrangbæk  and  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Introduction  of  Choice  in  Scandinavian 
Hospital Systems. Arguments and Policy Processes in the Danish and the Norwegian Case». 
March 2004.  
6‐2004  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Internationalization  at  Norwegian  Universities  and  Colleges  after  the 
Quality Reform». April 2004. The Globalization Program. 
7‐2004  Hans‐Tore  Hansen,  Anne  Hege  Trædal‐Henden,  Olaf  Jürgens  and  Wolfgang  Voges:  «Poverty 
among Households with Children: A Comparative Study of Lone Parents and Couples with 
Children in Norway and Germany». April 2004. 
8‐2004  Renate  Storetvedt  Lien  og  Arnhild  Taksdal  «Integrering  av  kjønnsperspektiv  i  offentlig 
tjenesteproduksjon og planlegging». Mai 2004. 
9‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy  og Synnøve Serigstad: «Tilsyn  som  styringsform  i  forholdet mellom  staten og 
kommunene». Mai 2004. 
10‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Legemiddeltilsyn og europeisering». September 2004. 
11‐2004  Bodil  Ravneberg:  «Økonomiske  insentiv  i  arbeidslinjen,  virker  det?  Evaluering  av 
forsøksordning med kvalifiseringsstønad i ’Prosjektet Amalie’ i Åsane». Oktober 2004. 
12‐2004  Per  Lægreid  and  Synnøve  Serigstad:  «Organizing  for  Homeland  Security:  The  Case  of 
Norway». November 2004. 
13‐2004  Ivar Bleiklie: «Institutional Conditions and  the Responsibilities of Universities». November 
2004. 
14‐2004  Lise Hellebø: «Food Safety at Stake – the Establishment of Food Agencies». November 2004. 
15‐2004  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Institutional  Construction  of  Consumerism.  A  Study  of 
Implementing Quality Indicators». November 2004.  
16‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy and Anne Homme: «Governance  in Primary and Lower Secondary Education. 
Comparing Norway, Sweden and England». November 2004. 
17‐2004  Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid and  Inger Marie Stigen: «Performance Management and Public 
Sector Reform: The Norwegian Hospial Reform». December 2004. 
18‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Regulatory  Agencies  −  The  Challenges  of  Balancing 
Agency Autonomy and Political Control». December 2004. 
19‐2004  Dag  Arne  Christensen:  «Velferdsstat,  rettighetslovgivning  og  lokalt  selvstyre».  Desember 
2004. 
SPECIALIZAT ION AND COORDINATION:  … WORKING PAPER  7  -  2005  
 29 
20‐2004  Kristin  Rubecksen:  «Civil  Service  Organizations  in  Norway:  Organizational  Features  and 
Tasks». December 2004. 
21‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «National  Versus  International 
Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2004  Birte Folgerø  Johannessen: «Ledelse og evidens  i det psykiske helsevernet, konsekvenser  for 
kunnskapsforståelse og organisering». Desember 2004. 
23‐2004  Jacob Aars og Svein Kvalvåg: «Politiske uttrykksformer i en bykontekst». Desember 2004. 
24‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing in the Labour Market. Country Report − Norway». December 
2004. 
25‐2004  Torgeir Sveri: «Strukturer og reformer. En kvalitativ analyse av reformen  ’Enhetlig  ledelse’ 
sett i lys av sykehusets arbeidsorganisering». Desember 2004. 
26‐2004  Stig Helleren: «Arbeidstilsynets rollekonflikt: Vekslende tilsynsstrategier mellom kontroll og 
veiledning». Desember 2004. 
27‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Odd  Rune  Straume:  «Globalisation  and  Union 
Opposition to Technological Change». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
28‐2004  Frode  Meland:  «A  Union  Bashing  Model  of  Inflation  Targeting».  December  2004.  The 
Globalization Program. 
2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen og Per Lægreid: «Politisk styring og privatisering: holdninger i elitene og 
befolkningen». Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg and Tor Helge Holmås: «A Panel Data Study of Physicians’ 
Labor Supply: The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Unionised  Oligopoly,  Trade 
Liberalisation and Location Choice». March 2003. The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  –  the  Significance  of  Attitudes 
Towards Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The 
World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa  in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The 
Globalization Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina  Berven:  «Cross National  Comparison  and National  Contexts:  Is what we  Compare 
Comparable?». July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde  Hatleskog  Zeiner:  «Kontrollhensyn  og  kontrollpraksis.  En  studie  av  Food  and 
Veterinary Office (FVO)». August 2003. 
13-2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD». August 2003. 
14-2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». «Den 
sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15-2003 Ilcheong Yi: «The National Patterns of Unemployment Policies in Two Asian Countries: 
Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16-2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17-2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18-2003 Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i 
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
WORKING PAPER  7  –  2005 SPECIALIZAT ION AND COORDINATION:  … 
30 
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
SPECIALIZAT ION AND COORDINATION:  … WORKING PAPER  7  -  2005  
 31 
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ’non‐intervention’ og ’samfundsvillie’. Statleg og kommunal 
regulering av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nurses’ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
